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THE ORIGIN OF LIVING THINGS
JULIUS SEILER
A

SHORT TIME AGO, the South-German

* * Radio Network presented a series
of discussions among leading specialists
on the origin and development of living
things from the points of view of biology and theology. These talks have now
appeared in book form under the title,
The Belief in Creation and the Theory
of Evolution, A Series of Discussions.1
The reader of the book is pleasantly
affected by the mutual respect which the
participating theologians and scientists
show one another despite their many
differences; this mutual respect is especially apparent in the highly informative concluding discussion which is almost entirely devoted to the question of
the origin of the first living beings. Theologian Günther Bornkamm noted that
it was generally a "refreshing relaxation
of the battle-lines" between the natural
sciences and theology, "an overall openness which our forefathers would not
have believed possible."2
The participants in this concluding
discussion were completely clear as to
the difficulty of the question posed by
the emergence of the first living beings.
The controversy revolves around the
problem of whether the first simple organisms may be understood to have
emerged from combinations of atoms
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and molecules according to purely natural laws or whether their explanation
involves the adoption of "higher laws."
No unanimous opinion was reached.
One scientist presented the view: "We
have no reason to believe that it is necessary to have recourse to anything but
physico-chemical laws."3 Another scientist believed that the decisive transition
to a self-propagating protein molecule
and from there to the first living beings
may have been accomplished through a
"quantum leap," i.e. through a microphysical process.4
This question concerning the causes
of the first living beings was sharply formulated, but its answer left something
to be desired; chiefly because not all apparently were clear as to what precisely
required clarification. T o some of the
scientists it seemed obvious that living
things are to be considered as no more
than complex chemical structures; therefore they sought an explanation of the
transition from simplicity to complexity.
It is our conviction that only a person
who grasps the organism as purposeful,
i.e. as an intricate purposeful order, can
see what truly requires explaining here.
A living thing is not merely a complex
chemical organization on a higher plane
than the simpler chemical compounds.
It manifests an orderly plan to a degree
that is absolutely unfathomable to us.
This conviction is not an abstract theory founded on a "world-view." It is,
rather, contained in the biological data
and therefore is a scientifically ascertained fact, even if its recognition involves trespassing into the fields of physics and chemistry. This decisive teleological element, which was not fully appreciated in the discussions, throws the
question of spontaneous generation into
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an entirely different light. We believe
therefore that the time is ripe to review
once again the question of the origin
of the first living beings from the standpoints of contemporary biology and philosophy.

1. The Problem
T T GOES WITHOUT SAYING that this ques-*• tion as to the origin of the first living
beings is of paramount importance.
While thinkers who believe in God see
a clear proof of a higher power in the
very phenomenon of life, those who hold
the opposite position take great pains to
explain it solely in terms of natural law.
The elucidation of that not entirely unfathomable mystery we name organic
life stands today, and has stood previously, at the very center of the biological
sciences. Therefore it is the serious responsibility of any thinker treating this
question not to be led by personal expectations but by a peaceful evaluation
of the factual arguments.

Biologists and philosophers have given
three essentially different answers to the
question. One view holds that life arose
without any influence from a higher
cause; a second view holds that life was
created in time by God. The third and
final view maintains that life has existed
from eternity without beginning, i.e. it
is as old as matter itself.5 The so-called
pan-sperm or cosmic-life theory, according to which life existed originally on
other heavenly bodies and subsequently arrived on earth, says nothing new
about the beginning of life and does
not constitute an independent theory to
be placed beside the other three. This
belief in an extra-terrestrial origin of the
first living cell is burdened with great
difficulties and has been rejected recently by authoritative biologists. Gerhard
Heberer renders the contemporary view
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of this theory in the following words:
"Today we can give only an historical
value to this theory, since we know that
ultra-violet rays alone would have killed
a living cell that might have freed itself
from another heavenly body. Secondly,
it seems that the age of the earth is the
same mathematically as the entire known
cosmos; and finally, life has a character
that is peculiar to the earth." 6 It is also
known that the age of the chemical elements which form the basis of organic
life runs to about five billion years. According to the laws which hold for the
disintegration of radioactive elements,
the age of the earth-crust is somewhat
more than three billion years. The age
of living things certainly cannot be greater than these periods of time. In view
of these considerations, contemporary
biologists exclude the theory of the "eternal" existence of life.
Having thus eliminated the "eternity"
theory there remain for further scrutiny
the hypothesis of spontaneous generation and the theory of creation. Special
attention will be given to the virus theory, a special form of the theory of spontaneous generation, and its implications
for the frequently asserted possibility of
the artificial production of living things.
In order to be in a position to make
a sound judgment on this difficult question, we must first ask what life is. Or,
to express it more precisely, we must
first ascertain what are the characteristic signs of life. It must be asked: Is life
made in such a way that natural factors, i.e., physico-chemical laws, suffice
to explain its origin, or must life be
unequivocally understood as a reality
which calls for the co-operation of a
higher intelligent cause? Before a deci*
sion can be made, it is necessary to view
a few peculiarities of living things more
closely, especially those relating to their
purpose, that is, to view them in their
teleologica! aspect.
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2. Observations on Teleology
in the Organic Realm
TT is NOT NECESSARY to present exten"*• sive evidence here for the existence
of teleology. This would be impossible
within the limits of such a short piece.
I shall merely refer to the very rich literature on the subject.7 Many older and
even a few recent writings on organic
teleology are not entirely unobjectionable since their arguments on behalf of
final causation are due to their own temporary deficiencies in physico-chemical
knowledge.
We do not intend to present solitary
instances of the existence of a purposeful order; instead we shall present a few
general considerations of decisive importance. The average non-specialist in biology is aware of a few special purposive
relations. The fact to which biologists
refer as "co-relation" is decisive: it consists in the ordering to one another of
the various organs in such a way that
they correspond to a plan which seems
to have been previously planned down
to the smallest detail. This observation,
however, shows us only individual ideological features—teleology in a potential
form.
It is well known that mechanistically
oriented representatives of the theory of
evolution seek to explain purposefulness
in terms of mutation and natural selection. Against this view, one can simply
point out certain "special forms" of purposiveness in view of which any mechanistic explanation becomes absurd. We
refer to the so-called "usefulness to others" or to primary purposefulness. Erich
Becher calls this "usefulness to others"
a peculiar, unilateral relation of service
from one type of organism to another,
(e.g. the relation between certain insects
and gall-forming plants).8 In these cases
the host plant is endowed with the ability to form organisms which are astound-
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ingly well suited for the parasites, and
which offer them shelter, protection and
nourishment without return for their
services. Such an "altruistic" relationship
would have been eradicated by natural
selection.
Gustav Wolff gives the name "primary
purposefulness" to the strikingly purposeful behaviour of organisms, which,
when placed in a situation of stress, never experienced by their predecessors, nevertheless liberate themselves without effort or hesitation.9 Wolff reports one
such case (the subsequent regeneration
of the eye-lens of the salamander; the
lens was artificially removed while the
other was spared), and he remarks:
"The publication of the phenomenon
of regeneration caused a bad nightmare
for prevailing biology."10 This case embarrassed the defenders of the theory of
natural selection, according to which
natural selection may be thought of only
in those dispositions and forms which
had involved numerous advantages for
the forebears of the subject in question.
In view of the ideas and plans realized in the organic world, it is quite justifiable to speak of nature as a designer
(we do not mean an impersonal nature,
but rather the higher power which is
revealed in it). The purposeful construction and activity of living beings is analogous to the way human beings purposefully combine the characteristics of
matter and the laws of nature and use
them to meet their needs. Purposefulness reveals the existence of an incomparably deeper knowledge of the laws
of nature and of matter—a knowledge
which moreover deals with its object in
a spirit of free play. Laws which the
physicist discovers at first cursorily and
which he then probes and validates
technically with infinite difficulty, to our
astonishment, have already stood at the
service of various purposes in organisms
for millions of years. This inventiveness
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shows itself, among other things, in an
especially impressive way in the adaptation of many living beings to extreme
environmental conditions (heat, cold, climate, enemies, predators, abnormal pressure, the darkness of the deep sea, etc.).
The history of evolution reveals an
entirely new view of teleological reality;
it seems that the basic plan or at least
the characteristics of the basic plan
which organisms have run through in
their past must have been purposefully
worked out down to the smallest detail.
By convergence we refer to the phenomenon of distinct and widely separated
species systematically and independently developing similarly constructed organs. It might be mentioned in opposition to this observation that similar
tasks are mastered by various species
with a copious variety of differing means.
Just think of the plenitude of attack
and defense weapons at the disposal of
various organisms.
Teleology appears under still another
aspect in the instinct of animals.11 Although in this instance it would not include the capacity for thought, it does
include purposeful consciousness. It is
not without reason that animal psychologists seek out the "purposes" of instincts, and in those cases where instinct
seems to lack a purpose, the method for
determining a purpose is to search for
a possible purpose at an earlier stage
of evolutionary development. Although
contemporary literature on organic teleology speaks of human and brute consciousness as being "borne" by organic
structures and processes, it neglects the
consideration that these very structures
and processes themselves are loaded with
innumerable purposeful aspects. It suffices to think of the many disturbances
of consciousness that rest on organic
causes.
Purposefulness is usually considered
inasmuch as it is directed toward the
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usefulness of an individual or a species.
This "teleology of usefulness," however,
is only one manifestation of a higher intelligence within the organic realm.
Over and above the standpoint of utility, nature displays a super-experimentation with ideas and aesthetic forms;
in certain areas she reveals herself to be
a genuine artist. This significant experimentation is at times indifferent from
the standpoint of utility; at other times
it is clearly disadvantageous to both the
organism and the species. For this reason an explanation of this phenomenon
in terms of natural selection cannot
stand.
Only a biological specialist is in a position to survey the multitudinous goals
revealed within nature, and to anticipate the wealth of means adapted to
them. And even such a specialist is constantly reminded that he is at most a
modest beginner. The biological sciences reveal the wonder of organic purposefulness in a measure which overpowers all conceptions.
An impartial observer of organic life
is most deeply impressed by the abundance of ideas and by the dynamic phantasy which surpasses itself endlessly in
new plans and in the realization of new
goals. The reality of underlying purposes
and the reason which sustains them is
manifest to any impartial judge. The
precise inter-relation of these causal and
final factors, however, remains hidden
in darkness.
One of the participants in the discussion mentioned above expressed the
view: "So long as the question under
consideration remains purely physical, a
'higher order' can be spontaneously developed from the 'lower order'."12 Prescinding from the fact that the concept
of "order" as it is used in this statement
is entirely too vague, we hasten to point
out that by restricting the question to
physical events, the teleological order
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and with it all that is essential to life
is completely overlooked. Although observation of physical phenomena is certainly justified, it cannot contribute to
the question of the origin of the teleological order. It would seem that the
crux of the matter is to be found in a
discussion of the problem of spontaneous generation.
One might object to these considerations by saying that the theme under
discussion is not our contemporary, fully
developed organic world, but the emergence of those first, very primitive living
beings which presumably would have
shown no teleological features to a contemporary human observer. This objection may be answered immediately by
the consideration that those who uphold
the theory of spontaneous generation do
not admit to any subsequent introduction of a teleological order when dealing with the higher development of the
original organisms. Biologists agree that
the fully developed teleology of today
was already present in the first organisms. Even if the minuteness of the structures involved in the micro-organismic
world (which would include the first
living beings) sets a limit to our ability
to determine its nature, experts nevertheless agree that finality itself goes beyond this limitation to that which can
be observed, and is indeed a sign of
living things themselves. These observations on the purposeful order of contemporary organisms would merely bring to
light something which lay hidden in the
darkness of these minute structures
many ages ago. Only this viewpoint will
allow us to see the teleological dispositions inherent in them.
As far as the remaining positions
which deny finality are concerned, it appears that they deny either the existence
of teleology or the possibility of proving
it with certainty, or, finally, the ability
to trace it back to a higher intelligence.

All of these positions are based on philosophies and not on fact. They cannot
be overlooked because of the often-repeated comment that things often do,
in fact, exhibit a real or apparent lack
of purpose. So long as life itself remains
a great mystery for us, no one can expect to see all the goals of living nature.
Apparent exceptions to a law of purpose, however, often reveal themselves
to a higher viewpoint as a well-ordered
striving for other goals. Exceptions to
purposefulness can also be explained by
the presence of certain blind factors as
well as a higher intelligence; the former
cause matter to prove obdurately opposed to certain purposes.
Anyone who wants to explain the appearance of the first living beings must
make the actuality of the purposeful order understandable or else he will have
by-passed the real question. And purposeful order of the proper dimensions can
have its basis only in a supernatural intelligent Being, Who, in the final analysis, is identical with God.
3. The Hypothesis of
Spontaneous Generation
QPONTANEOUS GENERATION generally re^ fers to the first appearance of a
living thing not derived by propagation
from living forefathers. If one uses the
term in this broad sense, it has three
possible interpretations: one is that living things have been created by God;
the second states that they have evolved
through the operation of physico-chemical laws, and the third believes that
they can be produced artificially by man.
In practice, however, the term "spontaneous generation" is understood almost
exclusively as the emergence of organisms as purely natural events, i.e. as
events determined solely by natural laws.
These events must be viewed as the result of chance or a sequence of chances.
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The older champions of the theory of
spontaneous generation (Huxley, Haeckel, Nägeli and others) postulated, in a
rather vague form, that simple and later
more highly organized living things
formed themselves out of non-living matter. The contemporary advocates of this
theory take pains to discuss this alleged
"formation process" in close conjunction
with present knowledge of chemical processes. They ask the question: "How
could organic chemical matter have
arisen from inorganic matter on the
earth's surface without the co-operation
of living beings? They refer especially
to the emergence of those two types of
matter which are characteristic of living
things, protein and the acids of the nucleus." 13 They also raise the further
question of how protein can possibly
propagate itself: this is most important
because the self-propagation of protein
is decisive in the formation of living
beings. The advocates of spontaneous
generation concede in all these debates
that the question involves an uncertain
groping. Bernard Rensch, an outspoken
champion of the theory, makes the following observation: "The answer to this
question, of great importance to philosophy, takes us outside the realm of biology. In any case an answer cannot be
definite, for the relevant research is now
in a period of lively development, and
the foundations must be laid for much
that is still hypothetical." 14
An original suggestion was made by
the Russian scientist A. J. Oparin. 15 He
rejects the theory of spontaneous generation held by western biologists who
state that the first living things emerged
suddenly at a definite point in time, since
it cannot accord with dialectical materialism. Oparin suggests that life developed in a slow continuous process as a
"special form of existence of matter in
motion."
The metaphysical position underlying
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the thinking of the majority of the representatives of the hypothesis of spontaneous generation is reflected in the following words of Gerhard Heberer: "No
matter how you turn and twist the problem of spontaneous generation . . . it
cannot be denied . . . At a definite point
in time, the process which we call life
must have begun. Spontaneous generation is and remains a 'logical postulate/
and biology agrees with Nägeli that to
deny spontaneous generation is tantamount to proclaiming miracles. Thus
the stages which eventually led to the
emergence of the life-process may not be
thought of as falling outside the general
laws of nature." 16
The firm a priori expectation that the
cleft between the inorganic and the organic will be bridged in a purely natural way, i.e. without any creative influence, is clear in all these remarks. Spontaneous generation, as its advocates ever
reaffirm, is not based on the propensity
"to proclaim miracles." Whoever admits
miracles must also admit an extra-mundane creator. An unbiased position towards this momentous question would
at least have to leave open the possibility of the creation of the first living organism.
Heberer's assertion in the passage
above that the emergence of life "may
not be considered as beyond the limits
of natural law," may be countered by
the statement: "The law for the emergence of a living being is: Omne vivum
a vivo." This proposition is just as much
opposed to spontaneous generation as it
is to the theory of creation. The teleological order which a theory of the emergence of life would have to explain is
completely overlooked; how, therefore,
can Heberer maintain his unreserved assertion that "all contemporary biologists
recognize spontaneous generation." At
the present time there are quite a few
leading biologists approaching this ques-
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tion, without any preconceived opinions,
who reject the theory of spontaneous
generation and who are not at all disturbed by the consequences of this rejection.
The well-known specialist Ludwig
von Bertalanffy says: Only one thing
can be said about spontaneous generation by chance. "The emergence of life
from an interplay of inorganic forces,
compared with which the emergence of
an automobile from an iron mine would
be a trifle, simply could not have occurred. The Darwinian phrase that only
the fittest of the many possible combinations would survive does not help at
all for the simple reason that a 'struggle for existence' could have started
only when those mechanisms, doomed
to this deadly combat, were already in
existence."17
Among those most competent to deal
with this question is Herman Staudinger, professor of chemistry at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, and recipient of the Nobel prize in 1953 for his
pioneering discoveries. His special area
of research is macro-molecular chemistry, the chemistry of large molecules,
(i.e. those carbon units whose molecular
weight is over 10,000 and which therefore consist of somewhat more than 1500
individual atoms. The substances of primary importance for living beings belong to this group.)
Staudinger takes this attitude to the
problem: "As a result of the broader development of the natural sciences, we are
now at a turning point which forces us
to revise our concept of spontaneous
generation . . . [We must] return to the
standpoint . . . that only a living organism is capable of producing its own
macro-molecular substrate. Even if we
should achieve a synthesis of individual
macro-molecular substances, we will not
thereby have produced a living organism
any more than we could produce a build-
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ing of a particular architectural style
by chance placement of millions of different building materials. Just as the
construction of such an edifice is the result of an ordering mind, it must be
supposed that the disposition of elements for the macro-molecule of protein
or indeed for the emergence of a living
being is much more than a contiguous
play of forces.
"That which happens so regularly cannot have chance as its basis. The prevailing unifying order in organic nature
is subject to law in the highest possible
degree, since that which evolves as living
is not merely a spatial whole like a crystal; rather it is a functional whole. If
this complexity in the construction of
living matter is kept before one's eyes,
the conception of a simple spontaneous
generation of living matter from inorganic material . . . no longer remains
tenable."18 Thus the hypothesis of spontaneous generation does not find support in the results of contemporary biologyFor reasons quite different from those
of the mechanistically oriented biologists, E. Ginter believed a few years ago
that he should adopt the theory of spontaneous generation in order not to have
to attribute the disharmony in the organic realm to God. He writes: "Today
the possibility is seen of explaining
even this event (the emergence of living
things) in terms of purely natural laws.
Once this is assumed, God is no longer
the immediate author of present organic
forms and their living activities and thus
is not responsible for the disharmony in
their life: for example, the lack of mercy
in the life of predators."19 Unfortunately this reasoning is not valid since Ginter attributes the purposeful order of
things to chance. If he is referring to
the advanced development of all presently living organisms, then it goes without saying that within the context of
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our present discussion, God is not their
"immediate author."
4. Artificial Production of Organisms
settled that living
^ ^ things do not evolve spontaneously, the question then arises whether man
might be able to produce such beings
artificially. If the chemist were successful, then it might be possible that the
same combination of substances which
man brings together to produce life
might at one time have come about accidentally; thus at least the possibility
of spontaneous generation would be established.
| ^ \ N C E IT HAS BEEN

The possibility of the artificial production of life has been constantly affirmed during the past few decades. The
great biologist Roux himself thought seriously of it. Oparin observes: "At the
beginning of our century many authors
went so far as to assert that they had
succeeded in producing life artificiall y . . . The artificial construction of life,
the synthesis of living things, appears indeed as a distant, but nevertheless completely attainable stage on this path." 20
Alexander Nilitschek expresses the view:
"Perhaps in the next few years a scientist
will be successful in a laboratory experiment . . . i.e., under the strictest control,
in actually producing a living being from
non-living substances and thereby answering the question of spontaneous generation with which mankind has so concerned itself for centuries." 21 If all the
statements on the artificial production of
living beings made during the course of
the last few decades are examined, it
can be seen that, with the progress of
research, they become ever more modest
in their tone.
It is not surprising that the advocates
of the theory of spontaneous generation
and the mechanistic view of life hope
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for the artificial production of living
matter. The fact is nevertheless that life
as such and the processes of life have
remained an impenetrable mystery right
up to the present day. The artificial production of organisms would assume that
the mystery of life has been solved and
the secret of organic processes and structures has been disclosed. But how do
leading biochemists view this question?
Tadeus Reichstein, professor of chemistry at the University of Basle, who was
awarded the Nobel prize in 1950, writes:
"As of today, a living being has never
been produced artificially. I hold the
probability that it will happen extremely small." 22 Paul Karrer, professor of
chemistry at the University of Zurich,
distinguished with the Nobel prize in
1937, writes: "Modern research has not
even begun to show the possibility of
artificial production of living cells."23
The chemist Paul Müller of the Ciba in
Basle, whose synthesis of D D T was rewarded with the Nobel prize in 1948,
observes somewhat more extensively:
"So much is certain . . . that we are quite
far from the production of artificial cells,
much less the production of artificial
living organisms. The mystery of the
production of a new organism is something so marvelous that we pitiful denizens of the earth can only confess abashedly that we do not understand it. Overconfident scientists appear to me like
little children who can break down a
machine into its smallest parts. When
they want to put it together again, that's
quite a different story. They have not
understood the mysterious force which
drives the machine." 24 The Freiburg
chemist Staudinger expresses himself on
this question in the following words:
"Chemical understanding has grown in
its knowledge of living beings (i.e. we
presently understand more complex processes than we did previously) and at
the same time, we have been forced to
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withdraw from the mechanistic postulate of synthesis in a test tube."25
An objection might be made to these
statements since their denial of the possibility of artificial production of life is
based exclusively on our present knowledge. How will future research judge it?
Such thoughts are silenced as soon as
one thinks of the great caution expressed
by unbiased scientists doing research in
the field. This apparent timidity is the
expression of our complete lack of
knowledge and of our perplexity in regard to deeper biological laws. Therefore, as Paul Müller in the letter above
so openly admits, even the greatest scientist can only stammer like a child
when speaking of the ultimate mystery
of life.
If in spite of all these indications, we
still wish to assume that the synthetic
production of the smallest living beings
is possible, what would success in this
area mean for the theory of spontaneous
generation? Even if man should succeed,
it would not mean that the theory of
spontaneous emergence was established.
It would only mean that man, by a singular achievement of his intelligence in
well-planned experimentation, had been
able to pass on the life he himself already possessed. If one were to conclude
from an artificial production of organisms by man that the spontaneous generation of life had occurred without benefit of a planning intelligence, one would
have to assume that the collective intellectual achievements of mankind, ranging from the invention of simple machines to automatic adding machines
and on to the creation of the Beethoven
symphonies might also have emerged by
chance. No reasonable man would dare
draw this conclusion, for life is more
than a complex structure of elementary
particles.

5. Are Viruses Intermediary
Substances in the Spontaneous
Generation of Life
A

FURTHER

POSSIBILITY

of

proving

* * their case has presented itself in
recent decades to the advocates of the
theory of spontaneous generation—viruses. An examination of this possibility leads us to ask what are viruses and
how do they stand in relation to the
spontaneous generation theory?
During the past century a successful
search was made for the agents underlying many contagious diseases: these
agents are microscopically small one-celled living beings, the notorious bacilli
and bacteria. Despite zealous research,
however, the agents underlying other
contagious diseases were not discovered.
It was conjectured, therefore, that they
were so small as to remain unobserved
even by the most powerful microscopes.
They were called viruses, i.e. poisons. A
great number of virus types have been
discovered within the past thirty years
by the electron-microscope which permits an enlargement a hundred times
greater than did the light microscope.
The newly discovered viruses exhibited
tiny particles which were more simply
constructed than any previously known
microcosmic living beings. They appeared at first glance as intermediaries
between lifeless matter and micro-organisms. For this reason many biologists believed that they could appeal to viruses
as intermediaries in the spontaneous
generation of life. This "virus theory"
is thus a special form of the theory of
spontaneous generation.
There have been many memorable results of virus research. Several hundred
types of virus are recognized today as
underlying agents of certain diseases.
They are named after the diseases they
cause: hoof and mouth disease, infantile
paralysis, influenza and jaundice, to
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name some of the best known. The virus
particles attain a size of only a ten-thousandth to a hundred-thousandth of a millimeter in diameter. They share with
living beings the ability to propagate
themselves and the ability to mutate. By
mutation we mean a sudden change in
patrimony which persists and is manifested in succeeding generations. Viruses
are composed of protein and the acids
of the nucleus as are the chromosomes
of truly living beings. Unlike living beings they do not breathe and they undergo no change of matter. Furthermore,
viruses which attack plants can form
crystals. Fundamentally, viruses differ
from the microcosmic life we have
known hitherto because they are able to
breed only in living tissue.
How then do they multiply and propagate themselves? Authorities in the field
believe that virus particles penetrate the
living cells of plants and animals and
cause these cells to produce similar virus particles: They insert themselves
spontaneously into the reduplicating
processes and utilize them for their own
good. The cells of the invaded plants
and animals respond to the lure of the
viruses by bringing forth from their own
substance the very poison which will
cause their downfall. According to our
present knowledge, viruses do not have
the independent ability to reproduce
themselves as do all genuine organisms.
Now the decisive question arises as to
how these strange virus-particles came
to exist in the first place. Not only the
genuine living beings, but these viruses
too, must have emerged somewhere at
some time. Scientists have two views on
the matter.
The first regards the virus as a distorted plasmic element, a deviation, a
chemical compound departing from the
norm. According to this view, an irregular atypical protein particle has emerged as the result of an accidental dis-
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particle probably retained the ability to
produce particles similar to it from other molecules.
According to another hypothesis, the
viruses are the last remains of deteriorated parasites. We know that there are
tens of thousands of parasites who live
on other plants and animals (the hosts)
and prosper at their expense. Many of
these parasites have deteriorated and today possess only those organs which are
absolutely essential for life. This process
of deterioration is seen as having terminated at a point where only a minimal core of the original cell remains.
This core, it is believed, is forced to
reproduce itself via its host. The Basle
chemist T. Reichstein observes in this
connection: "There is a theory which
identifies the virus as the genetic substance of extinct living beings. This
would explain much about viruses, especially their capacity to duplicate under suitable conditions in a host cell.
The viruses have remained as a peculiar
quality of life from which life itself has
been taken—i.e. they are the result of the
nearly total deterioration of a parasitic
kingdom."26
The question arises whether viruses
are really living or non-living matter.
Since they possess certain characteristics
of living things (mutability and the capacity to propagate), one tends to classify them among living beings. On the
other hand they do not possess certain
other attributes equally characteristic of
living things—digestion, irritability, and
teleological behavior.
If mutability is understood as the capacity of highly complex molecules to
break down under external influences
(so called quantum-leaps), then it is not
restricted to genes and chromosomes, but
extends to complex, unstable non-living
substances. In the case of living beings,
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these changes become clear as genuine
mutations only in the sequence of generations. Living beings alone have the
capacity to reproduce without external
co-operation. It is just this capacity for
independent propagation that viruses
lack. They can only propagate themselves with external assistance, through
an alteration in the normal process of
forming protein in atypical cells. The
role that viruses play in this process cannot be called a vital one, it is rather a
purely mechanistic result of the process.
Therefore neither mutability nor the
ability to propagate can be used to prove
that viruses have life.
They lack the characteristic signs of
life. They are merely highly complex individual molecules. Even the smallest
living beings consist of a large number
of differing individual molecules. Weidel observes: "Viruses, in contrast to
cells, are completely lifeless constructions. This is explained by their lack
of functional completeness."27 Bernard
Rensch has made a similar observation.28
We should now consider the most important question raised by the existence
of viruses: whether or not these forms
are to be considered intermediaries in
the complex process of spontaneous generation. It would be possible to speak
of them as intermediaries analogously
with regard to the few characteristics
they have in common with the smallest
organisms. William Troll says: "We
would misjudge viruses if we claimed
them in a speculative way for the purposes of the theory of spontaneous generation."29 On the contrary, the spontaneous emergence of viruses may be
considered a disturbance at the end of
the protein synthesis process in cells
(Troll). And, finally, the artificial production of virus particles is not impossible.
The chief argument used against viruses as the original form of life is the

fact that they are nourished only by organic substances; they are parasites and
must presuppose life. Adolf Budensandt
(1939 winner of the Nobel prize for
chemistry) expressed his view on the matter in this way: "It appears for these
reasons that we may not view the viruses
as the immediate predecessors of presently living cells. How could viruses
have propagated themselves without the
presence of a living cell? At the present
it seems probable that viruses are backward mutations and extremely distorted
parasitic organisms."30
Since it would appear conclusively
that the theory of spontaneous generation does not hold true, and that life
clearly seems to be the work of a supraworldly intelligence, it would seem inevitable to turn to God as its first creator. This conclusion is, however, far
from universal, and is hotly protested
by some.
6. Opposition to Tracing Life to
an Extra-Mundane Intelligence
C O R DECADES there has been no attack
*· on the theory of the creation of life
by God so violent as Nicolai Hartmann's.
Hartmann acknowledges teleology in the
organic realm to its full extent and even
regards it as the essential characteristic
of life. He guards himself, however, from
a view that would attribute the striving
for goals which things exhibit to an intelligence, i.e. a cognitive consciousness:
"Where in the processes of nature is
there a consciousness or even an instance
of anything functionally co-ordinated to
a consciousness which would be able to
project purposes into the future and to
choose recurrent means for their attainment? Such an instance can be supposed
in the form of an intellect or in the form
of a world-reason; metaphysics has usually supposed one or the other of these
without any scruples. Such a supposition,
however, is not justified by the phenom-
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ena, and the critique of the theory of
knowledge has long since proved it to be
untenable/' 3 1 "A final nexus . . . which
one at first believes to be the factor underlying the emergence of a highly developed consciousness is self-prohibitive,
for it depends on determination of ends
as well as on predetermination of means.
The life process, however, is nothing less
than consciously directed, even in highly developed and conscious living beings.
Consciousness does not know about its
functions; it is rather carried along by
them/' 3 2 Yes, Hartmann asserts, the disavowal of a final "world-form" is the
"greatest achievement of contemporary
thought, its liberation from the nightmare of teleology."33 He anticipates a
special "form of determination" distinct
from efficient and final causality which
he names "nexus organicus," and to
which he should like to reduce teleology. What this type of cause is and how
it works cannot be stated at the present
time. The answer to these questions
would doubtless require "the discovery
of further categories."34
It seems to us an astonishing misunderstanding on Hartmann's part if he
believes that one desires to trace organic purposefulness to an individual living
being, and that a teleology, borne by an
intelligence, can be found only in living
beings with highly developed consciousness. This philosopher appears never to
have considered the possibility that an
extra-mundane intelligent being might
be the author of earthly purposefulness.
So Hartmann, who handles other matters with sovereign reality, is taken unawares by passion when he objects to
the explanation of teleology through
God. Otherwise how could a dispassionate thinker experience the final intention of teleology as a nightmare? Instead
of trying to explain this decisive and
pressing question himself, Hartmann
trusts to the future to do so.
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Gerhard Heberer thinks along lines
similar to Hartmann's when he claims:
"The supposition of the parentless generation of every biological event by the
theory of creation contradicts the Harweyian thesis (omne vivum a vivo). It is
most improbable and cannot be seriously considered by a biologist."35 Heberer,
an advocate of the theory of spontaneous
generation, overlooks the fact that all
the reasons he summons to attack the
theory of creation argue equally well
against the one he is defending which
"contradicts
the Harweyian thesis
through its supposition of the parentless
generation of every biological event."
Uncommonly informative in regard to
this less and less popular position is the
following citation by Heinrich Schmidt
from the widely circulated Philosophisches Wörterbuch: "Order and purposefulness in nature must again and again
be explained in terms of natural reasons
and according to natural laws; AND
EVEN T H E WILDEST HYPOTHESES
HERE ARE MORE TOLERABLE
THAN SUPERNATURAL ONES." 36
(author's capitals). Schmidt is no longer
asking which explanation seems closer
to natural events; he is, rather, asking
which interpretation, daring as it may
be, appears more or less tolerable.
We must distinguish between the genuine opponent of the theory of creation
and the position of the man who says
that we can know nothing about the
origin of the first living beings. The latter states that it is impossible to decide
whether life goes back to an act of creation, to spontaneous generation, or to
some unknown origin. This position is
agnosticism. "Man would surely not be
man if he did not again and again find
a new tree in God's garden behind which
to hide himself from his creator." 37 T h e
"agnostic" position would be less objectionable were it formulated in this way:
The question of the first appearance of
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life lies outside the jurisdiction of biology. The latter is concerned actually
with the operation of mundane causes. It
must be kept in mind, however, that it
is as a man, and therefore as a philosopher, that the biologist is confronted
with this decisive question. The limitations of the sciences do not account for
a man's responsibility towards his own
conscience.
7. God as Creator of the First
Living Beings; the Participation
of Natural Causes
T N THE LIGHT of what has gone before,
•*• an extra-mundane, intellectual Power, the omnipotence and wisdom of the
Creator, must be unequivocally recognized as the cause of the first living beings.38 This follows on the one hand
from the purposeful order which surpasses all human understanding and on
the other from the breakdown of all other proposed explanations. The following words by Wilhelm Troll indicate
that many contemporary researchers acknowledge this conclusion: "Krönig
speaks . . . of the creation of organic
nature as the work of a 'reflective creator/ Lecomte de Nouy has undertaken
the task of showing that a mathematical
pursuit of the problem leads to the admission of an extra-terrestrial Power's intervention. This is the same solution to
the problem of spontaneous generation
that Reinke had already reached at the
turn of the century. It was his wellfounded conviction that the first cell
could have emerged 'only through the
intervention of cosmic Reason on the
surface of the earth.' "39

Having acknowledged the fact of divine authorship, we must confess that
nothing is known about the particular
way in which He created the first living
being. Conceptions concerning the creative activity of God are necessarily in-
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adequate. Just as God's existence cannot
be adequately conceptualized, neither
can his operations.
It is especially necessary to guard oneself from conceiving God's creative activity to be a violent intervention, an
interference. Many a person who thinks
of God's activity in the world in this
way recognizes its inadequacy and is
tempted to reject completely the power
of God in the cosmos. It is quite correct
to reject such an inadequate conception.
It is incorrect however to believe for
this reason that the creative activity of
God and the divine origin of life must
be rejected. If, for want of more suitable concepts, we are forced to speak of
God's operation as an "intervention," we
must be aware that this signifies an unnatural external influence. The difficulties disappear if we take the trouble to
put aside our all-too-human notions of
God. Just as the blossom unfolds from
the bud and fruit ripens, so we can think
of the first living things as arising from
the creative breath of God.
Although the first organisms are the
work and realization of the divine plan,
it may be assumed that in one great
event God placed his already existing
physical and chemical laws at his service. Therefore it is an important task
of the sciences to discover how far inanimate nature and its powers have contributed to the emergence of the first
living beings. It is quite possible that
those researchers who are advocates of
the theory of spontaneous generation
will contribute greatly to the clarification of this special question, for the discussion of this process of emergence solely in terms of natural laws presents many
intricate aspects.
The scientific study of the emergence
of the first living organisms must have
as its point of departure the physical
conditions which reigned on the surface
of the earth at that far-off time. There-
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fore the astro-physicists too have an im
portant role to play. It seems that in
that primeval atmosphere oxygen and
carbon dioxide were either completely
lacking or were present only in mi
nute quantities. It would follow that
the first organisms were neither animal
nor vegetative beings in our current
sense of the words; nevertheless they
somehow possessed some interchange of
matter.
The question now arises as to whether
organic compounds, which were the pre
liminary steps toward the highly complex
matter of which bodies of organisms
consist, could have emerged under those
conditions. Nobel prize winner Adolf
Buttenandt reports a relevant experi
ment carried out by the American chem
ist Stanley L. Miller in Chicago in
1953.40 He allowed an artificially pre
pared primeval atmosphere, composed
of methane, ammonia, hydrogen and
steam to circulate in a simple glass ap
paratus. Energy was conveyed to the sys
tem via a continuous electrical charge
which probably played an important
role in the permutations of the primeval
atmosphere. After a reaction time of
eight days, the results of the experiment
were worked out under the strictest ster
ile conditions and it was shown that
masses of amino acids which could be
weighed, especially glycol and alpha and
beta alanin, had emerged along with
small masses of asparagin and alphaamino butter acids. The road from the
emergence of amino acids to the forma
tion of a protein molecule may be a
great one; the road from a protein
molecule to the organization of a living
cell is even greater—however the ques
tion as to how organic compounds could
have emerged without the co-operation
of living beings in past historical periods
is now experimentally possible."
It is a self-evident and very serious
duty of the natural sciences to clarify,
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in so far as they can, all the natural
laws involved in this most significant
process. If God is the author of the or
ganic purposeful order and the Creator
of the first organisms, it does not follow
that he created the first living things
from nothing at one stroke. The mys
tery of life becomes ever greater with
the progressive clarification of the phys
ico-chemical point of view; but by the
same token, the force of a planning Rea
son which is thereby being realized, be
comes ever more palpable. The believer
has no reason to fear that research will
ever give an explanation of life with
out God. Finally it is not fitting for a
level-headed scientist to designate God
as a "stop-gap" at "those places for which
he cannot give a scientific explana
tion." 41 The mystery of life is more than
"a gap" in our physical knowledge.
Translated

by GERALD FARLEY
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